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The Metacognitive Anger Processing (MAP) Scale – Validation
in a Mixed Clinical and a Forensic In-Patient Sample
Stine Bjerrum Moeller
Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen
Per Bech
Psychiatric Research Unit, Mental Health Centre North Zealand
Background: The metacognitive approach by Wells and colleagues has gained empirical
support with a broad range of symptoms. The Metacognitive Anger Processing (MAP) scale
was developed to provide a metacognitive measure on anger (Moeller, 2016). In the preliminary
validation, three components were identified (positive beliefs, negative beliefs and rumination)
to be positively correlated with the anger. Aims: To validate the MAP in a sample of mixed
clinical patients (n = 88) and a sample of male forensic patients (n = 54). Method: The
MAP was administered together with measures of metacognition, anger, rumination, anxiety
and depressive symptoms. Results: The MAP showed acceptable scalability and excellent
reliability. Convergent validity was evidenced using the general metacognitive measure (MCQ-
30), and concurrent validity was supported using two different anger measures (STAXI-2 and
NAS). Conclusions: The MAP has promising potential to assess anger regulation problems by
providing a framework on angry rumination as well as the belief structures that proposedly drive
the selection of this maladaptive processing strategy as suggested in the metacognitive model.
These findings may have implications for clinical interventions. For example, conducting
functional analyses on anger rumination could increase the understanding of dysregulated
anger processing and lead to new interventions focused on shifting thinking style.
Keywords: clinical and forensic patients, metacognitive beliefs, anger rumination, anger
dysregulation, metacognitive measure
Introduction
Wells articulated the self-reflective executive functioning model (S-REF model) (Wells, 2000),
proposing that regulation of cognitive activity is conducted as a result of the individual’s
cognitive goals and the application of different mental strategies implemented to reach those
goals. In that proposal, elevated levels of positive and negative metacognitive beliefs result in the
activation of a thinking style that interferes with the down-regulation of unwanted cognitive
and emotional experiences. Metacognitive beliefs are ‘aspects of cognition that control the
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way a person thinks and behaves in response to a thought, belief or feeling’ (Wells, 2009,
p. 4). The interfering thinking style is named the Cognitive Attentional Syndrome (CAS). The
CAS consists of maladaptive strategies marked by self-focused attention, threat monitoring,
and repetitive cognitions, preventing the individual from applying appropriate metacognitive
awareness and flexible metacognitive control in response to unwanted cognitive and emotional
experiences. Due to positive metacognitive beliefs, the individual perceives mental strategies,
such as rumination or worry, as solutions, failing to see them as part of the problem.
Anger has an adaptive potential in securing personal safety and assisting in reaching
important life goals, when it is processed with sufficient control. However, anger presents
as a clinical problem when it is triggered too frequent, too intensely, is prolonged in duration,
or triggers excessive aggression (Novaco, 2007). In other words, the anger experience in itself
is not problematic, but it becomes a problem when it is dysregulated.
While the behavioural models of anger explain anger by referring to its contingencies,
the cognitive models emphasize the appraisals of perceived unpleasantness and causes
of frustrations (DiGiuseppe and Tafrate, 2007). The metacognitive approach understands
emotional dysregulation (e.g. problematic anger) as the application of maladaptive
metacognitive strategies for regulating cognition that backfires and maintains emotional
dysregulation. As such, it adds to the standard cognitive and behavioural approach by
introducing that the response to own cognitive activity (manifested in the application of certain
metacognitive strategies for controlling cognitive activity) constitute cognitive processing
relevant in regard to emotional distress and dysregulation. In regard to anger, the metacognitive
approach proposes that elevated positive beliefs about anger increase the tendency to activate
and maintain anger in response to unpleasant thoughts and emotions, because anger is
viewed by the person as a viable coping strategy. However, due to elevated negative beliefs
about anger as being dangerous and uncontrollable, the emotional arousal (anger) can be
perceived to be threatening and beyond personal control. The significance of positive and
negative metacognitive beliefs in regard to anger is reflected in the duality that anger has
in its associations. To illustrate this, Novaco (2007) used the Roman Janus metaphor – two
faces pointing in opposite directions suggesting a duality of psychosocial images. On the one
hand, anger is associated with eruptive and destructive feelings linked to madness, while on
the other hand, anger is associated with energizing and empowering experiences linked to
survival systems. Positive beliefs about anger/aggression as a strategy to achieve a desired
goal have been empirically associated with aggression (Archer and Haigh, 1997a,b; Bailey
and Ostrov, 2008; Bellmore et al., 2005; Huesmann and Guerra, 1997). Negative beliefs about
anger/aggression reflect the historical view of anger as a mental disturbance, a madness or an
insanity, conceiving anger as an uncontrollable, diseased state of mind (Potegal and Novaco,
2010). Reviews on cognitive processes involved in problematic forms of anger have emphasized
the importance of rumination1 (e.g. Denson, 2013; Owen, 2011), due to its association with
increased anger and aggression (Denson et al., 2006; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001; Wilkowski and
Robinson, 2010). In a small case series study among individuals referred for anger problems
using a semi-structured interview, Simpson and Papageorgiou (2003) reported that all patients
confirmed that they ruminated after an anger episode, all patients held negative metacognitive
1 Angry rumination is recurrent negative thinking focused on past experiences of anger and thinking about the causes
and consequences of anger episodes (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001).
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beliefs about angry rumination, and eight out of 10 held positive metacognitive beliefs about
angry rumination.
Cartwright-Hatton and Wells developed the MetaCognitive Questionnaire (MCQ;
Cartwright-Hatton and Wells, 1997) to assess the components of their proposed metacognitive
framework (Wells, 2000). A growing body of literature indicates that the five metacognitive
components of the MCQ are associated with a broad range of symptoms and a range of measures
focusing on metacognitive beliefs and thought control strategies have been successfully adapted
for specific problems, including psychosis (The Beliefs about Paranoia Scale; Morrison et al.,
2005), insomnia (Metacognitions Questionnaire – Insomnia; Waine et al., 2009)Waine, alcohol
(Positive Alcohol Metacognitions Scale and the Negative Alcohol Metacognitions Scale; Spada
and Wells, 2008), depression (positive beliefs about depressive rumination; Papageorgiou
and Wells, 2001), and anger (Metacognitive Anger Processing scale; Moeller, 2016). In the
preliminary validation of the MAP among 192 police students and 167 male prisoners (Moeller,
2016), three components of a metacognitive framework on anger were identified (positive
beliefs, negative beliefs, and rumination) and positively correlated with anger.
Current study objectives
The target population for the MAP is persons exhibiting clinical problems involving anger,
which has been demonstrated to be present in a wide range of disorders (Novaco, 2010).
Therefore, the main goal of the present study was to test the validity of the MAP in a sample
of mixed clinical patients and a sample of male forensic patients. Analyses for the scalability
of the MAP with regard to its Positive beliefs, Negative beliefs, and Rumination subscales
were conducted for the combined samples and divided by sample type (mixed clinical, male
forensic in-patient). To evaluate convergent validity, the theoretically expected relationship
between the general metacognitive measure and the MAP was explored in the clinical sample,
while concurrent validity with established anger measures (NAS, STAXI-2 and ARS) was
evaluated in both samples.2
Method
Participants
In view of the relevance of anger among psychiatric and forensic patients (cf. Moeller et al.,
2015; Novaco, 2011; Posternak and Zimmerman, 2002; Swogger et al., 2012; Ullrich et al.,
2014), participants included a sample of mixed clinical patients and a sample of male forensic
in-patients. Diagnoses were extracted from the patient’s files.
Mixed clinical sample The clinical patients were recruited from the psychiatric facilities
located in two rural towns in Denmark. All available patients were invited to participate.
Information on refusal to participate was not collected. Two closed wards, one open ward and
three outreach teams3 recruited patients. The settings represented the natural variability of
2 To avoid tiring the participating patients, concurrent validity in the forensic sample was only established with the
NAS.
3 An outreach team visited the patient at his or her home, or wherever the patient preferred to meet.
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Table 1. Socio-demographic and psychiatric characteristics of the mixed clinical patients (n = 88) and
male forensic in-patients (n = 54)
n (%) n (%)
Mixed clinical Forensic
Property patients∗ patients
Gender (male) 36 (47%) 54 (100%)
Ethnicity Denmark 83 (97%) 30 (56%)
Other 3 (3%) 24 (44%)
Education (highest level) No high school
graduation
13 (16%) 21 (39%)
High school 29 (36%) 22 (41%)
Professional training 32 (40%) 3 (5%)
Bachelor or further 7 (8%) 8 (15%)
Income Working 9 (11%) 1 (2%)
Temporary beneficiary 44 (54%) 16 (30%)
Retired 28 (34%) 33 (61%)
Other 1 (1%) 4 (7%)
Marital status Single 54 (64%) 51 (94%)
Relationship 30 (36%) 3 (6%)
Diagnosis Psychosis, schizophrenia,
bipolar disorder
23 (27%) 49 (91%)
Personality disorder 10 (12%) 1 (2%)
Affective disorder 42 (48%) 0 (0%)
Other 11 (13%) 4 (7%)
Substance abuse 11 (13%) 44 (81%)
Offence 11 (13%) 53 (98%)
Offence type Violence 10 (91%) 48 (91%)
Drugs 1 (9%) 5 (9%)
∗Missing: 4 gender, 7 education, 2 ethnicity, 6 income, 4 marital status, 2 diagnosis.
Denmark’s psychiatric facilities. The mean age of participants was 38.1 years (SD 14.2, range
16.0–74.0).
Male forensic in-patient sample The male in-patients were recruited by S.B.M. from the
forensic unit of the Mental Health Centre Sct. Hans in Denmark. The unit has 80 beds and low-,
medium-, and high-security levels. Patients are admitted under psychiatric orders imposed by
courts for having committed a serious offence and being unfit to endure punishment because
of severe psychopathology.
Of 88 available male forensic in-patients, 54 (61%) volunteered to participate. Females were
excluded, because they were limited in number (n = 8). The mean age of the patients was 36.4
years (SD 11.9, range 19–67).
Additional sample characteristics for both samples are given in Table 1.
Measures
Metacognitive Anger Processing scale (MAP; Moeller, 2016): this is a 26-item scale
assessing metacognition in relation to anger in three domains: (1) general positive beliefs about
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the functions of anger (e.g. ‘anger helps me solve problems’); (2) uncontrollable rumination
(e.g. ‘I cannot let go of angry thoughts’); and (3) negative conceptions related to anger,
particularly those focused on danger, harm and madness in association with anger (e.g. ‘anger
could make me go mad’). MAP items are worded solely to assess anger, avoiding overlap with
aggression. The items are rated on a 4-point scale (1 = never true, 2 = sometime true, 3 =
often true, 4 = always true). Alpha coefficients and test–retest reliability have been shown
to be satisfactory, and concurrent validity with measures of metacognition and anger has
been established with students and prisoners in separate studies (Moeller, 2016). Prior to the
studies presented in this paper, the MAP was revised based on those earlier studies. Five items
were omitted due to overlapping content, and three items were slightly reworded. One item
was retained because of its theoretical relevance, even though it loaded on two factors in the
preliminary testing.
Novaco Anger Scale (NAS; Novaco, 2003): this is a 60-item scale constructed to measure
anger disposition. Its items were generated from a theoretical framework. The Cognitive,
Arousal and Behavioral subscales each consist of 16 items. The sum of these 48 items forms the
NAS Total score. There is also a separate 12-item Anger Regulation subscale. All items are rated
on a 3-point scale of 1 = ‘never true’; 2 = ‘sometimes true’; and 3 = ‘always true’. Alpha scores
and test–retest reliability across various settings have shown excellent reliability (Novaco,
2003; Novaco and Taylor, 2004). The validity of the NAS has been established by independent
investigators (e.g. Hornsveld et al., 2011; Jones et al., 1999), including the prediction of violent
behaviour by psychiatric patients (Monahan et al., 2001). The Danish translation of the NAS
was conducted in collaboration with its original author. The reliability and validity of the NAS
Danish have been demonstrated by Moeller et al. (2015) in a multi-study project.
Stait Trait Anger eXpression Inventory (STAXI-2; Spielberger, 1999): this is a 57-item scale
constructed to measure a broad range of anger experiences and control. It has been revised
and adjusted over the last 10 years. Anger is assessed as a joint combination of individual
differences in dispositional anger (trait anger) and the momentary experience of anger (state
anger). The scale consists of six subscales measuring anger Trait Anger (T-Ang), State Anger
(S-Ang), and Anger Expression. The Anger Expression subscale measures outward expression
of anger (AX-O) to inward expression of anger (AX-I); it also has two anger-control subscales:
Anger Control-In (AC-I), which measures the tendency to invest energy in calming down
and securing inner control, and Anger Control-Out (AC-O), which measures the tendency to
invest energy in monitoring and preventing the outward expression of anger. The STAXI-2 is
generally considered a strong anger assessment instrument with a clear conceptualization and
solid psychometric properties in varied settings. In a STAXI-2 (Spielberger, 1999) study that
included data from 1600 normal adults and 274 hospitalized psychiatric patients, the reliability
scores were as follows: T-Ang ranged from .84 to .87; S-Ang ranged from .92 to .94; AX-O
ranged from .74 to .80; AX-I ranged from .74 to .82; AC-O ranged from .84 to .87; and AC-I
ranged from .91 to .93. Regarding validity, the STAXI discriminated between healthy and
clinical participants. The STAXI-2 was translated into Danish with written permission from its
original author. The questionnaire was translated by this manuscript’s first author and then back-
translated by a bilingual translator. The rewording of a few items occurred during this process.
MetaCognitive Questionnaire (MCQ; Cartwright-Hatton and Wells, 1997): this is a
measure used to assess general aspects of metacognition. The MCQ is presently the
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most consistently used tool for operationalizing the S-REF model. Wells and Cartwright-
Hatton initially developed the MCQ, which was later revised into a shortened version, the
MetaCognitive Questionnaire, short form (MCQ-30; Wells and Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).
The questionnaire was developed for anxiety, but has been used as a measure of general
components of metacognition. The focus of the questionnaire is metacognition in relation
to worry. It uses a scale from 1 to 4 in which 1 = do not agree, 2 = agree slightly, 3 =
agree moderately, and 4 = agree very much to measure metacognition on five subscales:
(1) experiences/evaluations of one’s own cognitive function, (2) positive beliefs about worry,
(3) experiences/evaluations of one’s own awareness of cognition, (4) beliefs and experiences
about danger and uncontrollability, and (5) beliefs about the need to control one’s own
cognition. The psychometric properties of the MCQ-30 were addressed satisfactorily, including
validation with other measures of worry and anxiety (Wells and Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). The
MCQ-30 was translated into Danish by other researchers (Austin et al., 2015).
Anger Rumination Scale (ARS; Sukhodolsky et al., 2001): this measures the tendency to
ruminate about anger. It contains 19 items on four factors: Angry After-thoughts (6 items);
Thoughts of Revenge (4 items); Angry Memories (5 items); and Understanding the Causes
(4 items). In a student sample (Sukhodolsky et al., 2001), internal reliability coefficients
satisfactorily ranged from .72 to .83 for the subscales and .93 for the ARS Total. In addition,
the 1-month test–retest reliability was adequate. Convergent validity tests were conducted with
the STAXI-2 Trait, reporting positive correlations ranging from .41 to .57 for the subscales
(Ibid). The questionnaire was translated by the first author and back-translated by a bilingual
translator, with permission from the author of the original questionnaire.
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983): this is a 14-
item self-report questionnaire measuring anxiety and depression. The respondent provides
ratings for his or her most recent week. Seven items measure anxiety, and seven items measure
depressive symptoms. Higher scores indicate higher levels of anxiety and depression. Its
reliability and validity have been established in clinical settings and in the general population
(Bjelland et al., 2002). However, several studies have also revealed problems in the construction
and psychometric properties of the HADS (e.g. Cosco et al., 2012). Using HADS to screen
for depression and anxiety disorders or differentiate between depression and anxiety does not
seem to be justified, but it is viable as a measure of general distress (Norton et al., 2013). In
the present study the HADS is used as a measure for symptom severity. The questionnaire is
available in the public domain and was translated and back-translated by a bilingual translator.
The assessment package for the clinical sample consisted of the MAP, NAS, STAXI-2,
MCQ-30, ARS and HADS. The assessment package in the forensic sample consisted of the
MAP, NAS and HADS.
Statistical analysis
Across participants and measures, less than 5% of responses were missing, and no respondent
was missing more than a total of three items. The values for the missing items were replaced
with the series mean for the item. For the study measures, ANOVA tests of mean differences
between the mixed clinical patients and male forensic in-patients were computed. To test
the psychometric validity of the MAP, we used the non-parametric Mokken analysis. It
entails the testing of each item of a scale to detect to what extent it stands alone on the
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dimension of severity tested by the scale and allow for testing the scalability of the MAP
with regard to its subscales: Positive beliefs, Negative beliefs, and Rumination. Analyses were
run for the combined samples and partitioned by sample type (mixed clinical, forensic). The
Mokken model (Mokken, 1971) is based on the Guttman cumulative rating scale principle
(Bech, 2012) that scorings on lower prevalence manifest items must be preceded by scorings
on high prevalence items. The scalability is evaluated by use of Loevinger’s coefficient of
homogeneity (Bech, 2012). According to Mokken (1971) or Van Schuur (2011), coefficients
of homogeneity from 0.20 to 0.29 belong in a questionable zone as to constitute a cumulative
scale, coefficients of 0.30 to 0.39 are acceptable, while a coefficient of 0.40 or higher
clearly indicates scalability. The Mokken analysis was performed using the MSP program
(Molenaar et al., 1994). Regression analyses were used to test convergent and concurrent
validity.
Results
No differences between the two samples appeared on the NAS, apart from the NAS Regulation
subscale, for which the male forensic in-patients unexpectedly reported significantly higher
regulation of anger than the mixed clinical sample. On the MAP, the male forensic in-patients
had significantly higher mean on the MAP Rumination subscale than the mixed clinical patients.
Regarding HADS scores, the mixed clinical patients had higher HADS Anxiety scores than the
male forensic in-patients. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and sample comparisons
for the anger and the metacognitive measures for mixed clinical patients and male forensic
in-patients. Internal reliability was excellent for the MAP.
The MAP’s scalability was investigated for the combined sample, and then separately for
the mixed clinical sample and the forensic sample. The coefficient of homogeneity for the total
score of the 26 MAP items was 0.36 for the combined sample (acceptable scalability), 0.37
for the forensic sample and 0.36 for the mixed clinical sample. The subscales all had good
scalability in the combined sample: Rumination 0.57, Positive Beliefs 0.57, and Negative
Beliefs 0.44. Subscales also had good scalability in the mixed clinical and in the forensic
sample, ranging from 0.36 to 0.66.
For the combined sample, Pearson inter-correlations between the subscales of the MAP were
highly correlated with the MAP Total. MAP Total and its subscales are positively correlated
with MCQ-30 Total. Results are given in Table 3.
To examine concurrent validity for anger, correlations for the MAP with the anger criteria
(NAS, STAXI-2 and ARS) were computed. Results are given in Table 4. Each of the MAP
subscales is substantially correlated with the NAS Total, STAXI Trait Anger, and ARS score
criteria.
To further test the concurrent validity of the MAP, a hierarchical regression with forced entry
was conducted on the mixed clinical sample data, with NAS Total as the criterion variable and
the HADS subscales, Trait Anger (T-Ang), and MAP Total as the predictors. On the first
step, HADS subscales were entered as covariates. T-Ang was entered on the second step,
and then MAP Total entered on the third step to test for its incremental contribution. The
HADS subscales entered alone were significantly associated with anger level (NAS Total),
adjusted R² = .254 (p < .001). When T-Ang was added to this equation on the second step, an
additional 44% of the variance in the criterion variable was explained (R² = .436; p < .001).
Entering the MAP Total on the third step explained an additional 11% of the variance in the
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics, internal reliability coefficients and ANOVA test of mean differences of
anger scores for mixed clinical patients and male forensic in-patients
Mixed clinical Male forensic
patients n = 88 (SD) Alpha in-patients n = 54 (SD) Alpha F (p)
MAP
PB 21.8 (7.1) .87 17.7 (7.4) .92 1.72
NB 21.8 (7.1) .88 21.2 (6.6) .85 .00
RUM 15.9 (5.8) .91 19.9 (7.6) .91 4.93∗
MAP Total 59.5 (16.2) .93 58.7 (17.7) .93 .09
NAS
COG 33.1 (5.9) .82 33.8 (5.9) .80 .53
ARO 33.6 (6.8) .85 31.4 (6.2) .79 3.70
BEH 30.4 (7.0) .89 30.5 (7.0) .86 .00
REG 24.6 (4.3) .71 26.9 (4.5) .77 8.90∗
NAS Total 97.1 (18.0) .94 95.7 (17.5) .93 .20
HADS
Anxiety 10.5 (4.6) .80 7.4 (5.0) .84 14.40∗
Depression 8.5 (4.9) .82 7.0 (4.5) .71 3.59
STAXI-2
Trait 23.0 (8.3) .91
State 22.4 (11.0) .96
AX-O 16.4 (5.2) .79
AX-I 19.7 (4.6) .68
AC-O 21.0 (6.1) .90
AC-I 19.6 (6.1) .89
MCQ-30
CC 26.9 (3.7) .87
PB 12.6 (5.2) .88
CSC 16.0 (4.8) .84
NB 16.0 (4.7) .77
NC 15.1 (4.8) .78
MCQ Total 33.7 (10.4) .89
ARS Total 43.2 (12.8) .93
∗p < .01. MAP, Metacognitive Anger Processing scale; MAP PB, positive beliefs subscale; MAP NB,
negative beliefs subscale; MAP RUM, rumination subscale; NAS, Novaco Anger Scale; COG, cognitive
subscale; ARO, arousal subscale; BEH, behavioral subscale; HADS, Hospital Anxiety and Depression
Scale; HADS Anxiety, HADS anxiety subscale; HADS Depression, Depression subscale; STAXI-2, Stait
Trait Anger eXpression Inventory; Trait, trait anger subscale; State, state anger subscale; AX-O, anger
expression out; AX-I, anger expression in; AC-O, anger control out; AC-I, anger control in; MCQ-30,
MetaCognitive Questionnaire; CC, cognitive confidence subscale; PB, positive beliefs subscale; CSC,
cognitive self-consciousness subscale; NB, negative beliefs subscale; NC, negative beliefs about need to
control thoughts; ARS, Anger Rumination Scale.
criterion variable (R² of .111, p < .001). The final model was significant, adjusted R² = .818,
F (4.83) = 93.44, p < .001. In the final model T-Ang (p < .001) and MAP Total (p < .001)
were significantly associated with anger level measured by the NAS Total, whereas HADS
subscales were no longer significant.
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Table 3. Correlations (Pearson) between the MAP subscales and measures of metacognition and anger
level (NAS Total) for male forensic in-patients (n = 54) and mixed clinical patients (n = 88)
MAP (n = 142) MCQ-30 (n = 88)
RUM NB PB PB NB CC NC CSC MCQ-30
Total
MAP Total .88∗ .82∗ .72∗ .07 .43∗ .40∗ .32∗ .03 .38∗
RUM .65∗ .46∗ .00 .44∗ .41∗ .18 –.05 .30∗
NB .31∗ –.01 .47∗ .37∗ .40∗ .02 .38∗
PB .19 .09 .17 .20 .11 .23
HADS Anxiety .44∗ .35∗ .09
Depression .26∗ .26∗ –.01
∗p < .01; n = 142 includes forensic sample and mixed clinical sample; n = 88 includes only the
mixed clinical sample. MAP, Metacognitive Anger Processing scale; MAP PB, positive beliefs subscale;
MAP NB, negative beliefs subscale; MAP RUM, rumination subscale; HADS, Hospital Anxiety and
Depression Scale; HADS Anxiety, HADS anxiety subscale; HADS Depression, Depression subscale;
MCQ-30, MetaCognitive Questionnaire; PB, positive beliefs subscale; NB, negative beliefs subscale;
CC, cognitive confidence subscale; NC, negative beliefs about need to control thoughts; CSC, cognitive
self-consciousness subscale.
Table 4. Correlations (Pearson) between the MAP subscales and the NAS for mixed clinical patients
and forensic in-patients (n =142), and the MAP and STAXI-2and ARS subscales for mixed clinical
patients (n = 88)
MAP (n = 142)
RUM NB PB
NAS (n = 142)
Total .73∗ .69∗ .55∗
Cognitive .59∗ .58∗ .58∗
Arousal .75∗ .66∗ .41∗
Behavioural .65∗ .64∗ .51∗
Regulation –.37∗ –.14 .03
STAXI-2 (n = 88)
Trait Anger .65∗ .62∗ .42∗
State Anger .47∗ .43∗ .42∗
AX-O .61∗ .59∗ .37∗
AX-I .52∗ .53∗ .05
AC-O –.45∗ –.38∗ .00
AC-I –.42∗ –.33∗ .05
ARS (n = 88) .75∗ .65∗ .43∗
∗p < .01. MAP, Metacognitive Anger Processing scale; MAP PB, positive beliefs subscale; MAP NB,
negative beliefs subscale; MAP RUM, rumination subscale; NAS, Novaco Anger Scale; STAXI-2, Stait
Trait Anger eXpression Inventory; AX-O, anger expression out; AX-I, anger expression in; AC-O, anger
control out; AC-I, anger control in; ARS, Anger Rumination Scale. The STAXI-2 and the ARS were only
administered in the clinical sample.
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Analyses performed on the coefficients in Table 4 found discriminant validity for the MAP
Rumination subscale as its correlation with the ARS (r = .75) is significantly higher than that
for MAP Negative Beliefs (r = .43; z = 4.28, p < .01) and for MAP Positive Beliefs (r = .65;
z = 1.65, p = .05) with the ARS in the mixed clinical sample. Also, the correlation of the MAP
Rumination with the set of four rumination items of the NAS Cognitive subscale were higher
for MAP Rumination, compared with the MAP Positive Beliefs and Negative Beliefs subscales
(r = .65 versus r = .53; z = 1.54, p = .06; and r = .35; z = 3.42, p < .01, respectively) in the
combined sample. In addition, MAP Rumination showed a negative correlation with the NAS
Regulation (r = –.37) and STAXI anger control (AC-O, r = –.45; AC-I, r = – .42), indicating
that this subscale measures a maladaptive anger processing strategy.
Discussion
The validity of the MAP as a metacognitive measure across samples is supported by the
magnitude of the correlations for the MAP with the MCQ-30, which were in the same range as
in the preliminary testing (Moeller, 2016). The validity of the MAP as an anger measure was
substantiated by its robust correlations with the STAXI and NAS criteria. Due to the thematic
overlap including the word ‘anger’ appearing in most items in the MAP, NAS and STAXI, at
least some level of inter-correlations will be expected. Interestingly, the MAP Positive Beliefs
had non-significant correlations with several STAXI Anger Expression subscales, Anger In
and both Anger Control scales (AC-O and AC-I), which calls for further investigation.
The convergent validity of the MAP Rumination subscale was substantiated by its strong
correlation with the Anger Rumination Scale (ARS), with the rumination items of the NAS
Cognitive subscale, and with STAXI Anger In. The high correlation between MAP Negative
beliefs and STAXI Anger In suggests that the perception of anger as uncontrollable and
dangerous may foster a tendency to try to withhold the expression of anger. That speculation
is supported by findings from Gilbert et al. (2004) showing that people restrain their anger
due to negative beliefs about the consequences of expressing anger (e.g. fear of rejection by
others, fear of losing control, fear of harming others). Experimental research has shown that
individuals instructed to withhold their emotional expression have an increased physiological
response compared with individuals with no such instruction (Gross and Levenson, 1997).
Indeed reviewing clinical evidence on low levels of anger expression among violent offenders,
Davey et al. (2005) identify over-control of anger as a maladaptive emotion regulation strategy
increasing the risk of violence. The MAP may prove helpful in conceptualizing variables
involved in withholding anger expression.
The male forensic sample had significantly higher mean on the MAP Rumination subscale
than the mixed clinical patients, which calls for further investigation. This finding could indicate
rumination as a particularly relevant treatment target for forensic patients.
Hierarchical regression analysis supported the MAP as an anger measure with psychiatric
populations that explain additional variance in the criterion variable (NAS Total), after
controlling for anxiety, depression and trait anger. Moreover, the correlations between the
MAP subscales and the anger criterion (NAS Total) in these clinical setting samples were larger
than those found in the student sample and prisoner sample preliminary study (Moeller, 2016),
verifying the clinical relevance of a metacognitive conceptualization of anger. In particular, the
correlation between MAP Negative beliefs and NAS Total had increased from the prior study
(r = .69 versus r = .34; z = 4.28, p < .01) advocating for the clinical relevance of experiencing
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anger as an uncontrollable and negative emotion as discussed by Novaco (Novaco, 2010;
Potegal and Novaco, 2010). Those results indicate that the MAP could be clinically useful in
conceptualizing anger dysregulation, particularly in psychiatric samples. However, the prior
study used the PI as the anger criteria measure, while the present study used the NAS.
The two studies presented have several limitations. First, the studies are cross-sectional and
rely on correlational statistics, hence a causal relationship between the proposed metacognitive
beliefs and maladaptive anger processing (rumination) cannot be inferred. Another limitation
is that the assessments are all self-reports of anger, with no behavioural measures, such as of
aggression. Future studies refining the scale will benefit from including observer measures of
anger and aggression and formulating a hypothesis regarding the interaction between MAP
subscales, including the discriminative validity to be tested in a longitudinal design with
repeated measurement. Ideally the MAP should be tested in an intervention study to investigate
its usefulness in clinical formulation and its sensitivity to change due to treatment.
These findings may have implications for clinical interventions. Relevant novel clinical
interventions for the treatment of anger problems could be interventions used in metacognitive
therapy (MCT) for depression (Wells, 2009) (e.g. advantages/disadvantages analysis of rumin-
ation, postponing rumination or attention training). In addition, interventions from rumination-
focused cognitive behavioural therapy for depression (e.g. practising shifting thinking style)
(Watkins, 2016) could prove helpful in treating problematic anger when anger dysregulation
is understood as a maladaptive processing routine as conceptualized by the MAP framework.
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